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THE "W ALKA WAY SHOP": LONG-TERM UNION 
A VOIDANCE AND MANAGEMENT DECISIONS TO OPEN 
NEW FACILITIES AS LAWFUL CONDUCT UNDER THE 
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Picture this scenario: 1 Unionized employees of a major 
manufacturer go on strike. Eventually, the strike ends and everything 
returns to normal. A few years later, the employer expands its 
operations, and instead of assigning the new work to the existing 
unionized facility, the employer chooses to locate the work at a new 
facility that will not utilize the unionized employees. The reasons for 
the decision include a generous financial package provided by the 
state where the new facility will be located and the employer's desire 
to avoid the impact of subsequent strikes on its operations. If this 
decision to open a new facility is part of the employer's long-term 
union avoidance strategy, does such conduct constitute an unfair 
labor practice? If not, should it? And if it does not, in what 
circumstances should long-term union avoidance constitute an unfair 
labor practice? 
The recent dispute involving the Boeing Company (Boeing) and 
the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers 
District Lodge No. 751 (lAM) presents a ripe opportunity for 
considering these questions. 2 Fortunately, the Boeing case was 
settled, and no National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) decision was 
necessary. 3 Unfortunately, whether Boeing's conduct would have 
been deemed an unfair labor practice remains unknown. In one 
sense, the system for adjudicating charges of unfair labor practices 
worked as it should: The union filed a charge, the NLRB regional 
1. This scenario is based on the facts of the dispute between the Boeing Company and 
the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers District Lodge 
No. 751. See discussion infra Part II.B.1. 
2. See Complaint and Notice of Hearing at 6-7, Boeing Co. v. Int'! Ass'n of Machinists 
& Aerospace Workers Dist. Lodge 751, Case 19-CA-3243I (N:L.R.B. Apr. 20, 2011). 
3. Fred Feinstein, Boeing Settlement Showcases the Value of Collective Bargaining, THE 
HILL (Dec. 16, 2011, 12:50 PM), http://thehill.comlblogs/congress-blog/labor/199945-
boeing-settlement-showcases-the-value-of-collective-bargaining ("As happened in the 
Boeing negotiations, the most common outcome of a complaint issued by the General 
Counsel is a settlement. In fact, more than 90 percent of complaints issued by the 
General Counsel of the NLRB are settled."). 
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director conducted an investigation, the NLRB General Counsel 
issued a complaint, an Administrative Law Judge began reviewing 
the case, and the parties settled before a decision was reached. 4 On 
the other hand, the settlement is unfortunate because no decision was 
rendered, and therefore, it remains uncertain whether conduct such as 
Boeing's constitutes an unfair labor practice. 5 
The critical issue that arises out of the Boeing dispute is not 
whether there were any unfair labor practices in that case specifically; 
rather, it is whether long-term union avoidance as embodied in 
capital allocation decisions constitutes or should constitute an unfair 
labor practice. To begin the task of answering this question, Part II 
of this comment discusses the purposes of the National Labor 
Relations Act (NLRA or the Act) and briefly summarizes the facts of 
the Boeing dispute. 6 This background provides a foundation for the 
subsequent discussion in Part III, which labels long-term union 
avoidance as manifested through capital allocation decisions as a 
"walkaway shop.,,7 Part IV sets forth a framework in which 
walkaway shops should be analyzed. 8 In so doing, Part IV 
distinguishes long-term union avoidance from transfers of work9 and 
analogizes such avoidance to partial closings. 10 Ultimately, this 
comment argues that a walkaway shop should constitute an unfair 
labor practice only when the circumstances indicate an employer's 
purpose to chill union activity at either the existing unionized plant or 
the newly created non-union facility.ll 
II. THE NLRA AND THE BOEING DISPUTE 
A. The Purpose of the NLRA 
The specific focus of this comment is how management decisions 
regarding new work should be analyzed under section 8(a)(3) of the 
NLRA, which preserves employees' right to engage in protected 
activity by prohibiting employer discrimination based on such 
employee conduct. 12 As amended by the Labor Management 
4. For an overview of NLRB procedures, see Unfair Labor Practices Process Chart, 
NAT'L LAB. REL. BOARD, http://nlrb.gov/node/3947(lastvisitedDec.11 ,2012). 
5. See discussion if!fraParts II.B.1-3, IV. 
6. See discussion infra Part II.A-B.1. 
7. See discussion if!fra Part III. 
8. See discussion infra Part IV. 
9. See discussion infra Part IV.A. 
10. See discussion infra Part IV.B. 
11. See discussion infra Parts lILA, IV.C. 
12. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.s.C. § 158(a) (2006) (making it "an unfair labor 
practice for an employer . . . by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of 
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Relations Act, the NLRA seeks to protect employees' right to engage 
in unionism while also delineating "the legitimate rights of both 
employees and employers in their relations affecting commerce.,,13 
Thus, at the heart of the Act is the notion that "[i]ndustrial strife ... 
can be avoided or substantially minimized if employers, employees, 
and labor organizations each recognize under law one another's 
legitimate rights in their relations with each other .... ,,14 
These statements make clear that there are rights afforded and 
obligations imposed upon each of the three stakeholders in labor 
relations--employers, employees, and labor organizations. 15 In the 
context of an employer's decision to create new work at a new 
facility, whether certain employer conduct should constitute an unfair 
labor practice comes down to finding a balance between employee 
and employer rights. 16 This comment suggests that an appropriate 
balance between employer and employee rights exists when 
employers are permitted to make capital allocation decisions and 
employees receive protection from employer conduct that is intended 
to stifle protected section 7 activity.17 Employers will have the ability 
to make core entrepreneurial decisions and employees' rights will 
receive protection under the NLRA. 18 
As stated by acting NLRB General Counsel Lafe Solomon, "A 
worker's right to strike is a fundamental right guaranteed by the 
National Labor Relations Act. . .. We also recognize the rights of 
employers to make business decisions based on their economic 
interests, but they must do so within the law.,,19 Accordingly, the 
core issue in an analysis of a management decision to create new 
employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage 
membership in any labor organization"); see also Peter F. Munger, Stephen X. 
Munger & Thomas J. Munger, Plant Closures and Relocations Under the National 
Labor Relations Act,S GA. ST. U. L. REv. 77, 78-79 (1988) (discussing section 
8(a)(3)'s prohibition against discrimination). 
13. Labor Management Relations Act of 1947,29 U.S.C. § 141(b) (2006). 
14. Id. 
15. National Labor Relations Act, §§ 151-169. 
16. See discussion infra Part N. 
17. Section 7 of the NLRA states in part, "Employees shall have the right to self-
organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, [and] to bargain collectively 
through representatives of their own choosing." National Labor Relations Act, § 157. 
18. See discussion infra Part N.C.4-5. 
19. Press Release, Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., Nat'l Labor Relations Bd. Issues Complaint 
Against Boeing Co. for Unlawfully Transferring Work to a Non-Union Facility (Apr. 
20, 2011), https:llwww.nlrb.gov/news/national-labor-re1ations-board-issues-
complaint-against-boeing-company-unlawfully-transferring-. 
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work is whether such a decision infringes upon fundamental rights 
guaranteed to employees by the NLRA.20 
The Boeing dispute provides the impetus for considering whether 
the NLRA adequately addresses management decisions regarding the 
creation of new work or whether the Act should be amended or 
reinterpreted to better serve its underlying policies. 
B. The Boeing Dispute 
1. The Complaint 
On April 20, 2011, the NLRB issued a complaint against Boeing 
for conduct in violation of sections 8(a)(I) and 8(a)(3) of the 
NLRA.21 The complaint alleged that Boeing interfered with, 
restrained, and coerced employees in the exercise of their section 7 
rights in violation of section 8(a)(I), and that Boeing discriminated 
"in regard to the hire or tenure or terms or conditions of employment 
of its employees, thereby discouraging membership in a labor 
organization in violation of [sections] 8( a )(3) and (1) of the Act. ,,22 
The complaint stated that Boeing "made coercive statements to its 
employees that it would remove or had removed work from the Unit 
because employees had struck and [Boeing] threatened or impliedly 
threatened that the Unit would lose additional work in the event of 
future strikes.'>23 Additionally, the complaint alleged that Boeing 
decided to transfer a production line from the existing Unie4 at the 
company's Puget Sound facility in Washington State to a new, non-
union facility in South Carolina. 25 
While this comment is not about the merits of the Boeing dispute 
specifically, the conduct noted in the complaint raises important 
issues concerning how the NLRA treats an employer's long-term 
union avoidance.26 The issue addressed here is whether long-term 
union avoidance as manifested through capital allocation decisions 
should constitute a violation of section 8(a)(3).27 
2. Distinguishing New Work from a "Runaway Shop" 
20. See discussion supra Part II. 
21. Complaint, supra note 2, at 7. 
22. Id. 
23. Id. at 4. 
24. The unit referred to in the complaint is comprised of the employees of Boeing as set 
forth in the collective bargaining agreement between Boeing and lAM and includes 
"all production and maintenance employees in Washington State." Id. at 3-5. 
25. Id. at 5. 
26. See id. at 7-8. 
27. See discussion infra Parts lILA, IV. 
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While the General Counsel's complaint alleged that Boeing 
unlawfully transferred work/8 this is not the case. Boeing did not 
transfer work; it opened a new facility that engaged in new work. 29 
Thus, the issue here is not whether there has been an unfair labor 
practice in the form of an unlawful transfer or plant relocation; this is 
not an example of a "runaway shop.,,30 A runaway shop occurs when 
an employer transfers or relocates work from a unionized facility in 
retaliation for employees' union activity.3l The label "runaway shop" 
was created to identify situations where an employer would close a 
unionized facility and transfer the work to a new, non-union facility 
with the purpose of evading the employer's obligations to interact 
with the union.32 
Based on the definition above, a decision to open a new facility that 
will engage in new work is not a runaway shop because no work has 
been lost at the existing facility. Hence, in the Boeing dispute, 
Boeing's decision to open a new facility in South Carolina is not a 
runaway shop because there was no loss of work at the existing 
unionized plant in Washington.33 In fact, the number of workers at 
Boeing's Puget Sound facility increased.34 
28. Complaint, supra note 2, at 5-7. 
29. See Steven M. Bernstein, The NLRB's Boeing Dreamliner Complaint: A Tangled Web 
of Legal and Political Controversy, 24 AIR & SPACE LAW., no. 2, 2011, at 13-15; 
Philip A. Miscimarra, Capital Investment, Relocations, and Major Business Changes 
Under the NLRA, 27 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 79, 89 (2011); Richard A. Epstein, 
Senseless in Seattle, DEFINING IDEAS (Apr. 26, 2011), http://www.hoover.org/ 
publications/ defining-ideas/articlel7650 I. 
30. See E. Walter Bowman, Note, Plant Relocation: Viewed After Denial of Eriforcement 
of Board's "Runaway Shop" Remedy in Garwin, 20 V AND. L. REv. 1062, 1062 (1966) 
("Plant relocation...,-the transfer of all or a portion of plant operations to another site-
can present two distinct categories of labor relations problems: (I) unfair labor 
practice problems under the National Labor Relations Act ('runaway shop' problems); 
and (2) problems of interpreting and applying a collective bargaining agreement."). 
31. Weather Tamer, Inc. v. NLRB, 676 F.2d 483,491 (lith Cir. 1982). 
32. Jan W. Sturner, An Analysis of the NLRB's "Runaway Shop" Doctrine in the Context 
of Mid-Term Work Relocations Based on Union Labor Costs, 17 HOFSTRA LAB. & 
EMP. U. 289, 289-90 (2000). 
33. See Diana Furchtgott-Roth, Federal Labor Board's Assault on Boeing Will Cost Many 
Jobs, S.F. EXAMINER, June 19,2011, at 18, available at http://www.sfexaminer.com/ 
opinionlop-eds/2011/06/federal-labor-board-s-assault-boeing-will-cost-rnany-jobs. 
34. Epstein, supra note 29 ("[U]nlike the employer's decision in Darlington Mills, 
Boeing's decision to open a new facility in South Carolina did not take away the job 
of a single worker in Washington state or the Portland area. Indeed, Boeing has 
expanded its workforce in that region by 2,000 workers."); see also Furchtgott-Roth, 
supra note 33, at 18. 
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3. Why a New Classification is Needed 
Because the creation of new work does not fit squarely within 
existing tests used by the NLRB to determine whether an unfair labor 
practice has been committed,35 it is necessary to develop a framework 
by which such management decisions can be analyzed. The question 
of how to treat an employer's capital allocation decisions is not new. 
For example, Professor Cynthia Estlund has commented that she has 
"been unable to locate any decisions holding that a withholding of 
capital investment from a union plant, or a decision not to place new 
or expanded operations at the plant, was discriminatory under 
[section] 8(a)(3)."36 Thus, under the current interpretation of the 
NLRA, "[i]t appears to be necessary ... to show that existing unit 
work was eliminated, subcontracted, or relocated.,,37 
In light of calls for a broader interpretation of the NLRA,38 this 
comment addresses how decisions regarding new work should be 
treated under the Act.39 In so doing, it suggests an approach that 
strives to preserve the legitimate rights of employers and employees40 
without infringing too far upon management's right to make core 
entrepreneurial decisions,41 or employees' right to engage in 
protected activity. 42 
As will be discussed in Part IV, a management decision to create 
new work at a new facility, by itself, is not and should not be seen as 
conduct that violates section 8(a)(3) of the Act. 43 Indeed, as former 
NLRB Chairman Peter Schaumber has noted regarding the Boeing 
dispute, finding an unfair labor practice in such a decision could have 
a negative impact on the economy.44 Schaumber contends that "[t]he 
filing [of this complaint] threatens job growth and a sustained 
economic recovery today," and asks, "What domestic or foreign 
employer will want to maintain a U.S. presence or create a new one if 
35. See discussion infra Part IV.A-C. 
36. Cynthia L. Estlund, Economic Rationality and Union Avoidance: Misunderstanding 
the National Labor Relations Act, 71 TEx. L. REv. 921, 943 n.80 (1993). 
37. Id. 
38. See id. 
39. See discussion infra Part IV. 
40. See infra text accompanying notes 148-50; cf National Labor Relations Act, 29 
U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2006). 
41. See infra notes 130-134 and accompanying text. 
42. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
43. See discussion infra Part IV. 
44. Peter Schaumber, NLRB's Chief Lawyer Should Stop Obstructing Congress, 
WASHINGTON EXAMINER (Nov. 15, 2011), http://washingtonexaminer.coml 
article/41438#.UKmWg-Oe9rd ("[W]e know the filing of this complaint is chilling 
business investment in the United States, and for good reason."). 
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the federal government can 
entrepreneurial decisions-where 
outsource?,"'5 
dictate the employer's core 
to locate, relocate, transfer or 
While decisions to relocate, transfer, and outsource can be 
evaluated under existing applications of the NLRA,46 decisions 
concerning where to locate new work are in a class of their own.47 
An underlying reason for finding such decisions lawful under the 
NLRA is that a decision to open a new plant with new workers, 
which does not negatively impact existing employees, is 
economicallyefficient.48 Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that 
certain decisions are rightfully within the purview of management,49 
and the Court's decision in First National Maintenance Corp. v. 
NLRB implies that management has the right to make certain 
decisions affecting the direction of the business without interference 
from the union or employees. 50 
At the very least, clarity is needed: management and labor, 
employers and employees, and politicians and the public need 
guidelines on what constitutes an unfair labor practice with respect to 
this type of management decision.51 The ambiguity surrounding the 
Boeing dispute and the hyper-politicization of the public debate on 
that matter beg for clarification that will be useful in America's 
economic recovery. 52 
45. Jd. According to Schaumber, "[The complaint] seeks to eviscerate the distinction long 
protected by the law between a core managerial decision based on the economic 
consequences of unionization and a management decision based on an employer's 
hostility toward its employees' union activities." Id. 
46. See discussion infra Part III. 
47. See Estlund, supra note 36, at 943 n.80. 
48. See Jeffrey D. Hedlund, Note, An Economic Case for Mandatory Bargaining over 
Partial Termination and Plant Collection Decisions, 95 YALE L.J. 949, 953-54 (1986) 
("By definition, economic efficiency is enhanced when parties make exchanges that 
leave one party better off without leaving the other worse off"). 
49. Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263, 268-69 (1965) 
(holding that an employer can lawfully close its entire business but cannot undertake a 
discriminatory partial closing). 
50. See First Nat'! Maint. Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 676 (1981) ("Congress had no 
expectation that the elected union representative would become an equal partner in the 
running ofthe business enterprise in which the union's members are employed."). 
51. See Schaumber, supra note 44 (arguing that Congress must act in the Boeing dispute 
and that businesses will not want to open plants in the United States if they run the 
risk of being unable to make certain business decisions). 
52. See Andrew Strom, Boeing and the NLRB-A 64-Year-Old Time Bomb Explodes, 68 
NAT'L LAW. GUILD 109, 110 (2011) (discussing how the Boeing complaint set off a 
"fire storm"); Schaumber, supra note 44 (discussing the harm to the U.S. economy 
caused by Congress' failure to clarify issues surrounding new work). 
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III. THE "W ALKA WAY SHOP" 
A. Defining "Walkaway Shop" 
Part II discussed the prototypical runaway shop-when an 
employer closes a union plant and transfers that work to a non-union 
facility. 53 To distinguish long-term union avoidance from the short-
term union avoidance evidenced in a runaway shop, this comment 
labels an employer's long-term union avoidance strategy a 
"walkaway shop." While long-term union avoidance is not a new 
concept,54 labeling the practice a walkaway shop is helpful for a 
variety of reasons. First, because of the existence of the term 
"runaway shop," the label "walkaway shop" provides for a simple 
comparison of certain employer conduct, eliciting an image of an 
employer's prolonged union avoidance strategy. Second, beyond the 
similarities with a runaway shop (that an employer is avoiding a 
union), the conduct walkaway shop describes is inherently 
different-there is no transfer of work and no immediate loss of work 
as a result of the employer's decision. 55 Thus, the label 
acknowledges that an employer is avoiding unionism while 
cautioning against rigidly categorizing management decisions under 
pre-existing labels. A walkaway shop is a gradual undertaking that 
mayor may not result in a loss of union jobs down the road. It is 
nothing more than a long-term union avoidance strategy as 
manifested through capital allocation decisions regarding the creation 
of new work. 56 
B. Critiques a/Long-Term Union Avoidance 
A walkaway shop should be lawful as described above because 
capital allocation decisions are the type of decisions that have been 
classified as management's to make.57 This premise, however, is not 
uniformly agreed upon, and there are some who would find an unfair 
labor practice in the decision to allocate capital to a new location 
itself, regardless of whether the employer's purpose is to chill 
53. See discussion supra Part II.B.2. 
54. See, e.g., Estlund, supra note 36, at 945--46. 
55. See discussion supra Part II.B.2. 
56. See discussion supra Part II.B.2. 
57. See Terry Collingsworth, Resurrecting the National Labor Relations Act-Plant 
Closings and Runaway Shops in a Global Economy, 14 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 
72,73 (1993) (discussing how in Darlington, "[t]he Court stated that without a clearer 
indication of congressional intent, it would not alter the fundamental assumption of 
the American economic system that decisions about the use of capital belong 
exclusively to its owners"). 
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unionism.58 For instance, Professor Estlund argues that there is a 
basis in the text of the NLRA "for pressing beyond the existing limits 
of the antidiscrimination mandate.,,59 Professor Estlund has 
commented that the NLRA "unequivocally condemns some rational 
employer conduct that would serve the firm's economic self-
interest.,,60 An example of such condemned conduct is section 
8(a)(3)'s "prohibition on anti-union discrimination," which makes it 
unlawful for an employer to discriminate in regard to the hire, tenure, 
or terms of employment of unionized workers. 61 Estlund believes 
that the NLRA's "sweeping language embodies a solid statutory 
mandate for going beyond current doctrine in curtailing employers' 
rational, market-driven conduct when it is necessary to enforce 
employees' right to choose and to act through unionization.,,62 The 
question is whether the language of section 8(a)(3) should be read to 
limit management decisions regarding new work. 
In her work, Estlund addresses "which employer decisions that 
eliminate jobs violate the NLRA.,,63 In the context of a new plant, the 
question becomes whether an employer violates the NLRA by 
opening a new, non-union facility in order to avoid the costs of 
unionization, when at the time the decision is made, there is no 
detrimental impact on the unionized facility.64 Professor Estlund's 
framework provides great assistance in answering the question posed 
in this comment. As Estlund notes, "Union avoidance in investment 
decisions is widespread.,,65 As an example, Boeing's decision to 
open a new facility in South Carolina is clearly union avoidance in an 
investment decision,66 regardless of whether the decision is lawful or 
unlawful. Not all union avoidance, however, is or should be 
unlawful. 67 
58. See Estlund, supra note 36, at 946-64. 
59. Jd. at 927. 
60. Jd. at 922. 
61. Jd. at 922 & n.2. Estlund characterized "[tJhe prohibition on anti-union 
discrimination" as "perhaps the least controversial and most fundamental of the 
NLRA's constraints on employers." Jd. at 922. 
62. Jd. at 928. 
63. Jd. at 926. 
64. See discussion supra Parts II.A, II.B.3. 
65. Estlund, supra note 36, at 926. 
66. See Complaint, supra note 2, at 1-8 (alleging that past strikes at Boeing's Puget 
Sound operations were part of the rationale for Boeing's decision to open a new plant 
in South Carolina). 
67. See Estlund, supra note 36, at 926. As Estlund states: 
At least some capital investment decisions that eliminate union 
jobs are subject to scrutiny under the Act's antidiscrimination 
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Estlund suggests that at the very least there should be mandatory 
bargaining over capital allocation decisions,68 given the historical 
rationale for the NLRA.69 Indeed, she finds flaws in the current 
interpretation of the Act and suggests that "the requirement of motive 
in these cases, and particularly the crucial dichotomy between anti-
union motives and economically rational motives, misconceives the 
nature of anti-union animus and thereby defines the range of 
prohibited employer conduct too narrowly.,,70 She is not alone. 71 
Others note that management's capital allocation decisions affect job 
security at existing plants.72 
Where Estlund argues that the current interpretation of the NLRA 
provides a too-confined scope of prohibited activity,73 this comment 
argues that such conduct should not, absent more explicit anti-union 
discrimination, be found to violate the NLRA. While this comment 
ultimately concludes that a walkaway shop should not in and of itself 
constitute an unfair labor practice, it also suggests that the current 
NLRA framework for analyzing management decisions should be 
modified to define when such decisions cross the line to the point of 
becoming an unfair labor practice. 74 In order to explain this 
distinction, it is necessary to understand how the existing analysis of 
Id. 
requirement and may be unlawful if they are found to have been 
motivated by "anti-union animus." But anti-union animus is 
defined in contrast to legitimate "economic" motives, which 
include efforts to avoid costs associated with unionization-in 
particular, higher labor costs. 
68. See id. at 979-80. 
69. See id. at 926-28 (arguing that the history and purpose of the NLRA support a broader 
interpretation of what employer conduct is prohibited). 
70. Id. at 926. 
71. See Collingsworth, supra note 57, at 73 (discussing how the Supreme Court has 
"interpreted the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) to protect the right of the 
owners of capital to make fundamental entrepreneurial decisions, affecting the nature 
and direction of the business, without interference from workers"); Christopher 
Hexter et aI., Twenty-Five Years of Developments in the Law Under the National 
Labor Relations Act, 25 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 299, 304 (20lO) ("[T]he very notion 
of a broad range of 'core entrepreneurial functions' exempt from bargaining is 
contrary to the Act's policies."). 
72. Richard Litvin, Fearfol Asymmetry: Employee Free Choice and Employer 
Profitability in First National Maintenance, 58 IND. LJ. 433, 442 (1984) ("Many 
significant management decisions in pursuit of profit or efficiency threaten the job 
security of some employees. In deciding to produce a new product, an employer may 
commit capital that it could have invested in maintaining or improving its existing 
products."). 
73. Estlund, supra note 36, at 926. 
74. See infra Part V. 
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management decisions under the NLRA would apply to a decision to 
invest in a new facility. 
IV. ANALYZING WALKAWAY SHOPS 
In determining whether a management decision to open a new 
facility constitutes an unfair labor practice, this comment begins with 
the assumption that decisions regarding new work should be treated 
differently from decisions that result in the loss of union work. 75 
There is something to be gleaned, however, from the existing test for 
partial closings that can help delineate when a walkaway shop should 
constitute an unfair labor practice. While section 8(a)(3) does not 
currently prohibit new investment decisions when there is no 
relocation, transfer, or removal of work,16 the framework proposed 
below strives to create a system in which such decisions do not 
necessarily constitute an unfair labor practice, but could in certain 
situations.77 In so doing, the proposed analysis of walkaway shops 
strikes a balance that protects the rights of both employers and 
employees. 78 
As a starting point, it is helpful to consider the following statement 
from Ark Las Vegas Restaurant Corp. v. NLRB: "It is well settled that 
an employer violates the NLRA by taking adverse employment 
action in order to discourage union activity.,,79 Inherent in this 
statement is the notion that there is no unfair labor practice if there 
has been no adverse employment action. 80 Thus, while section 
8(a)(3) places limits on what an employer can do in response to union 
activity,8! when the employer's decision involves neither a discharge 
75. Robert VerBruggen. Pulling Labor Law Out of Thin Air, NAT'L REv. ONLINE (Apr. 28, 
2011, 4:00 AM), http://www.nationalreview.comlarticles/265835/pulling-labor-law-
out-thin-air-robert-verbruggen ("It would seem odd for decisions about brand-new 
capacity to be treated the same as decisions to destroy existing capacity or fire 
workers .... "). 
76. Miscimarra, supra note 29, at 88-89 (discussing how section 8(a)(3) does not prohibit 
new investment decisions that do not involve relocations, transfers, or removal of 
work). 
77. See discussion infra Part IV.B-C. 
78. See discussion infra Part IV.B-C. 
79. Ark Las Vegas Restaurant Corp. v. NLRB, 334 F.3d 99, 104 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
80. See id. 
81. Collingsworth, supra note 57, at 83 (discussing how section 8(a)(3) "limits the 
freedom an employer otherwise would have to discharge employees or otherwise 
retaliate in response to union organizing activity"). 
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nor adverse employment action, the limits sections 8(a)(3) and 
8(a)(1) impose on employers should be different.82 
A capital allocation decision creating new work at a new plant has 
no negative impact if one agrees with the assumption taken here that 
not obtaining the new work is not an injury inflicted upon the existing 
unionized employees. 83 Indeed, decisions regarding new work fit 
within the description articulated by the United States Supreme Court 
in Textile Workers Union of America v. Darlington Manufacturing 
Co.: "Naturally, certain business decisions will, to some degree, 
interfere with concerted activities by employees. But it is only when 
the interference with [section] 7 rights outweighs the business 
justification for the employer's action that [section] 8(a)(1) is 
violated.,,84 Moreover, "[w]hatever may be the limits of [section] 
8(a)(1), some employer decisions are so peculiarly matters of 
management prerogative that they would never constitute violations 
of [section] 8(a)(1), whether or not they involved sound business 
judgment, unless they also violated [section] 8(a)(3)."85 
Given this backdrop, determining how to analyze walkaway shops 
is necessary in order to discern when long-term union avoidance 
constitutes an unfair labor practice. 86 To accomplish this task, the 
following sections compare and contrast walkaway shops with 
transfers of work and partial closings. 
A. Transfers of Work 
In one category of management decisions, transfers of work, the 
standard established in NLRB v. Wright Line is used to determine 
whether the employer violated section 8(a)(3).87 The Wright Line 
standard is a logical starting point, because in the Boeing dispute, the 
employer's conduct was dubbed a transfer of work. 88 
Under Wright Line: 
First, we shall require that the General Counsel make a 
prima facie showing sufficient to support the inference that 
82. See Estlund, supra note 36, at 943 n.80 (discussing how a management decision to 
open a new plant that does not negatively impact existing employees is not conduct 
currently prohibited by the NLRA). 
83. See VerBruggen, supra note 75. But see Strom, supra note 52, at 112-13 (arguing 
that the distinction between new work and a transfer of existing work should be 
"irrelevant"). 
84. Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263, 268-69 (1965). 
85. Id. 
86. See infra text accompanying notes 110-20. 
87. NLRB v. Wright Line, 662 F.2d 899, 904 (1st CiT. 1981). 
88. Complaint, supra note 2, at 5. 
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protected conduct was a "motivating factor" in the 
employer's decision. Once this is established, the burden 
will shift to the employer to demonstrate that the same 
action would have taken place even in the absence of the 
protected conduct. 89 
163 
The Wright Line standard is inappropriate in the context of a 
walkaway shop because there is no loss of union jobs when the 
capital allocation decision is made.90 Moreover, inherent in the 
concept of a walkaway shop is long-term union avoidance.91 
Therefore, if Wright Line were to be applied, an employer would 
always lose-the General Counsel would always be able to make its 
first stage case, and the employer's rebuttal would fail because the 
employer would not be able to show that the capital allocation 
decision would have been made in the absence of the protected 
conduct. 
Thus, distinguishing the creation of new work from the transfer of 
work is appropriate for two reasons. First, a walkaway shop involves 
no immediate loss of work, which is in direct contrast to an unlawful 
runaway shop.92 Second, refraining from using the Wright Line 
standard acknowledges that employers should be able to make capital 
allocation decisions based on a long-term union avoidance strategy 
instead of having to demonstrate legitimate economic reasons to 
justify employer conduct under section 8(a)(3).93 
Creating new work at a new, non-union facility because of the costs 
associated with past strikes or the possibility of future strikes is 
distinct from a transfer of work. 94 Again, the Wright Line standard is 
inappropriate because it emphasizes union animus, which is less 
critical in the walkaway shop scenario.95 One should not even reach 
the issue of animus if there has been no detrimental impact on 
89. Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. 1083,1089 (1980). 
90. See discussion supra Part III.A. 
91. See discussion supra Part III.A. 
92. See Munger et ai., supra note 12, at 80 & n.l6. 
93. See id. at 80. 
94. See Capehorn Indus., 336 N.L.R.B. 364, 366-67 (2001). 
95. See NLRB v. Transp. Mgrnt. Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 398 (1983). There is a difference 
between a decision to open a new plant without discharging any existing employees 
and a decision to transfer work such as what occurred in Transportation Management. 
In that case, the Court stated, "Soon after the passage of the [NLRAJ, the Board held 
that it was an unfair labor practice for an employer to discharge a worker where 
antiunion animus actually contributed to the discharge decision." Id. 
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employees.96 The critical issue in determining whether a walkaway 
shop is unlawful under the NLRA should not be generic union 
animus; rather, it should be an employer's specific purpose to chill 
union activity. Emphasizing the employer's purpose is the better 
approach because it will enable the NLRB to focus on an employer's 
efforts to impede employees in the exercise of protected section 7 
activity. 97 
An employer's decision to open a new plant should reasonably be 
viewed by the unionized employees as the type of decision 
management is expected to make. 98 After all, it is no secret that 
employers generally oppose unionization. 99 Instead, management 
decisions to open new facilities should be analyzed under a variation 
of the test used for partial closings. 100 
B. Partial Closings 
At first glance, a walkaway shop is quite dissimilar from a partial 
closing because no closing occurs when there is a walkaway shop. 101 
There are in fact, however, similarities between the two types of 
decisions. With a walkaway shop, there is the potential for the 
management decision to chill unionization at the new plant and 
protected activity at the existing unionized facility. With a partial 
closing, there is the potential for chilling unionization at any facilities 
that have not been closed; however, because the unionized facility 
has been closed, there is no chilling of protected activity at that 
plant. 102 As stated by Collingsworth, "[B]enefits do accrue to an 
employer who engages in a 'partial closing,' in that any remaining 
. employees at the employer's other facilities are likely to be 
discouraged in the exercise of their section 7 rights." 103 
Under the current application of the NLRA, a partial closing is 
illegal, "only if the employer's interest in some other business 
allowed him to obtain ongoing benefit from the closing."I04 
Moreover, "[a] prima facie case of a section 8(a)(3) violation is 
96. Id. at 401 ("[T]he Board's decisions ... have consistently held that the unfair labor 
practice consists of a discharge or other adverse action that is based in whole or in part 
on antiunion animus-{)r ... that the employee's protected conduct was a substantial 
or motivating factor in the adverse action."). 
97. See Munger et aI., supra note 12, at 80-81. 
98. See, e.g., Estlund, supra note 36, at 926. 
99. See id. at 928-29. 
100. See discussion infra Part IV.C. 
101. See discussion supra Part III.A. 
102. See Collingsworth, supra note 57, at 87-88. 
103. Id. at 88. 
104. !d. at 87-88. 
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established if the General Counsel for the [NLRB] makes a showing 
that employee conduct protected by the NLRA was the motivating 
factor behind the employer's decision to close or relocate a plant."lo5 
In contrast, with a walkaway shop, whether employee conduct 
motivated the decision should not be considered beyond being used 
in determining whether the employer's motive is to chill unionism. 
Indeed, what matters is the purpose of the employer's decision, as 
is the case with partial closings. 106 With walkaway shops, however, 
the inquiry into purpose should also consider whether the employer 
was motivated by a purpose to chill unionism at the existing 
unionized plant. Such a consideration would represent a departure 
from Darlington, where the inquiry was into whether there was a 
purpose to chill union activity at any remaining plants. 107 This 
comment suggests that the analysis for determining whether a 
walkaway shop constitutes an unfair labor practice should include an 
expanded version of the Darlington test. IOS If the test turns on 
whether there is a motive to chill unionism, then there can be 
protection for both the employee's interest in protected activity as 
well as the employer's interest in making core entrepreneurial 
decisions. 
Applied to a walkaway shop, the decision to open a new plant 
should be unlawful under the NLRA if the employer's purpose was to 
chill unionized activity at either the existing unionized plant or the 
newly created facility. This expansion is necessary because the 
NLRA should afford protection to unionized workers whose 
protected conduct is the target of the employer's decision. 
105. Mungeret ai., supra note 12, at 80-81. 
106. See Joel F. Herold, Note, Wages, Workers, and Potential Windfalls: Rethinking 
Section 8(a)(3) Labor Disputes in a Capitalist Economy, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 657, 
661 (1998) ("Motive is the key factor in detennining whether an employer's actions 
violated section 8(a)(3)."). 
107. Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263, 269 (1965). 
108. Id.; see also John O'Connor, Employers Be Forewarned: An Employer's Guide to 
Plant Closing and Layoff Decisions After the Enactment of the Worker Adjustment 
and Retraining Notification Act, 16 OHlO N.U. L. REv. 19,24 (1989) (discussing how 
in Darlington the owner instituted a partial closing in order to "chill unionism in other 
parts of the business . . . because they were . . . motivated by a desire to stop 
unionization in the owner's other plants and the owner reasonably could have foreseen 
that the closing would have that intended effect"). Thus, one can see that finding an 
unfair labor practice in a walkaway shop where the employer's purpose to chill 
unionism at either the existing unionized plant or the new non-union plant is simply 
an extension of the logic in Darlington. 
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C. Expanding Darlington's Test for Partial Closings 
The analysis of a walkaway shop should therefore proceed as 
follows. As in Boeing, there is a unionized plant. 109 The employer 
opens a new plant without any loss of jobs at the existing unionized 
facility. If the purpose of the decision is to chill union activity at 
either plant, then this conduct should constitute an unfair labor 
practice. llo If there is no purpose to chill protected activity, then 
there is no unfair labor practice. III 
This is not, however, the end of the analysis. The NLRA process 
will need to be used to determine whether there is an unfair labor 
practice if the employer subsequently decides to close the union 
facility. I 12 At this point, the existing partial closing analysis should 
be applied. I 13 The test for whether partial closings violate section 
8(a)(3) is set forth in Darlington. 1l4 There, the Supreme Court stated, 
"[A] partial closing. . . is an unfair labor practice under [ section] 
8(a)(3) if motivated by a purpose to chill unionism in any of the 
remaining plants of the single employer and if the employer may 
reasonably have foreseen that such closing would likely have that 
effect.,,115 
Thus, the Darlington test should be applied twice. The NLRB will 
look into the employer's purpose both when the capital allocation 
decision is made and again when, and if, there is a partial closing. 
Under Darlington, there has been a violation of section 8(a)(3) if the 
following three-part test is satisfied: 
If the persons exercising control over a plant that is being 
closed for antiunion reasons (1) have an interest in another 
business, whether or not affiliated with or engaged in the 
same line of commercial activity as the closed plant, of 
sufficient substantiality to give promise of their reaping a 
benefit from the discouragement of unionization in that 
business; (2) act to close their plant with the purpose of 
producing such a result; and (3) occupy a relationship to the 
other business which makes it realistically foreseeable that 
109. See discussion supra Part I1.B.l. 
110. See Darlington, 380 U.S. at 275. 
Ill. Thomas J. Schwartz, Plant Relocation or Partial Termination-the Duty to Decision-
Bargain, 39 FORDHAM L. REv. 81, 89 (1970). 
112. See discussion supra Part I1.A. 
113. See discussion supra Part IV.B. 
114. Darlington, 380 U.S. at 268-69. 
115. Id.at275. 
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its employees will fear that such business will also be closed 
down if they persist in organizational activities .... 116 
167 
To determine whether there has been an unlawful chilling effect, 
the NLRB considers three factors: 
(1) [A ]ny contemporaneous union activity at the facility to 
be closed and at the employer's other plants; (2) the 
geographic proximity of the employer's remaining plants to 
the closed facility; (3) the likelihood that employees at the 
remaining plants willieam of the circumstances surrounding 
the closure through employee interchange or contact; and 
(4) any representations made by the employer's agents to 
other employees. I 17 
With a walkaway shop, the NLRB would consider these factors, 
but they would first be analyzed in the context of a plant that has not 
been closed, but has instead not been selected for new work. A 
partial closing violates the NLRA "only when it is carried out with 
the intent and for the purpose of avoiding one's obligations under the 
ACt.,,118 Thus, a decision to open and operate a new facility away 
from an existing unionized facility would constitute an unfair labor 
practice only if the decision was made with the purpose to chill 
protected activity. I 19 
116. Id. at 275-76. 
117. Munger et aI., supra note 12, at 82 (citing Bruce Duncan Co., 233 N.L.R.B. 1243 
(1977); George Lithograph Co., 204 N.L.R.B. 431, 431-32 (1973); Motor Repair, 
Inc., 168 N.L.R.B. 1082, 1083 (1968». 
118. Bowman, supra note 30, at 1064. 
119. Even if one agrees with critiques of the motive requirement in plant relocation cases, a 
distinction between a plant relocation and creation of new work should at least be 
considered because with new work there is not necessarily any loss of union jobs. See 
discussion supra Part II.B.2. Accordingly, one could agree with Estlund that motive 
should not be required in a relocation case while also agreeing that motive is a proper 
consideration when an employer makes a capital allocation decision that results in no 
loss of work at an existing unionized facility. See Estlund, supra note 36, at 934-35 
(discussing how a relocation violates section 8(a)(3) only where the employer is 
"motivated by a purpose to avoid dealing with a union or to discourage union 
activity") . 
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1. Employer Statements 
An employer's statements should be considered in the analysis 
undertaken to determine the employer's purpose.120 If the employer 
makes illegal statements in relation to its capital allocation decision, 
these statements should point toward a purpose to chill unionism. 
Here, the NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co. standard should be applied. 121 
Thus, in the Boeing dispute, the NLRB would consider whether 
comments accompanying the decision to locate the new production 
line in South Carolina constituted coercive speech that would 
discourage unionized workers from engaging in protected section 7 
activity in the future. 
As stated in Gissel, "[A]n employer is free to communicate to his 
employees any of his general views about unionism or any of his 
specific views about a particular union, so long as the 
communications do not contain a 'threat of reprisal or force or 
promise of benefit. ",122 And if the employer makes a prediction, that 
prediction "must be carefully phrased on the basis of objective fact to 
convey an employer's belief as to demonstrably probable 
consequences beyond his control.,,123 Accordingly, a management 
decision to open a new facility as part of a walkaway shop strategy 
would constitute an unfair labor practice if the decision is 
accompanied by any statement that could reasonably influence 
employees in their exercise of protected section 7 rights, is a threat, 
or is a prediction that does not meet the Gissel standard, because such 
statements would be strong evidence of a purpose to chill 
unionism. 124 
2. Extensive Investigation into the Employer's Purpose Will Often 
Be Necessary 
As part of the analysis, it is necessary to consider whether the 
employer's conduct "carrie[d] with it an inference of unlawful 
intention so compelling that it is justifiable to disbelieve the 
employer's protestations of innocent purpose.,,125 Thus, in 
considering the employer's purpose, the investigation will inquire 
into the true motives of the employer by examining circumstantial 
120. Cf NLRB v. Saunders Leasing Sys., Inc. 497 F.2d 453, 456 (8th Cir. 1974) (holding 
that employer's statements concerning benefit withdrawal demonstrated unfair labor 
practice). 
121. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 618-20 (1969). 
122. Id. at618. 
123. Id. 
124. Id. 
125. Am. Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 309, 311-12 (1965). 
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evidence. 126 Accordingly, reaching the point of an investigation will 
often be necessary because the General Counsel will need 
infonnation and facts in order to detennine the employer's purpose. 
Such a detennination can be made only once there is investigation 
into the facts of a specific dispute. 127 If the investigation does not 
provide infonnation sufficient to detennine the employer's purpose, 
then the General Counsel would be justified in issuing a complaint so 
that additional facts could be ascertained through subpoenas and 
hearings. 128 
3. Mandatory Bargaining 
Some refonners call for a mandatory duty to bargain over 
management decisions to allocate capital to new plants. 129 Requiring 
mandatory bargaining would constitute a departure from the position 
put forth in Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB, where 
Justice Stewart stated in his noteworthy concurrence,130 "Nothing the 
Court holds ... should be understood as imposing a duty to bargain 
collectively regarding ... managerial decisions, which lie at the core 
of entrepreneurial control.,,131 Justice Stewart continued, "Decisions 
concerning the commitment of investment capital and the basic scope 
of the enterprise are not in themselves primarily about conditions of 
employment .... "132 Under the NLRA, bargaining is mandatory 
126. See id. 
127. See id. at 312-13. 
128. See National Labor Relations Act, 29 V.S.c. § 161 (2006). 
129. See Estlund, supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
130. See, e.g., Miscimarra, supra note 29, at 85-86 n.28 (highlighting the prominence of 
Justice Stewart's concurring opinion). 
131. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 V.S. 203, 223 (1964) (Stewart, J., 
concurring). Justice Stewart continued: 
ld. 
132. ld. 
While employment security has thus properly been recognized in 
various circumstances as a condition of employment, it surely 
does not follow that every decision which may affect job security 
is a subject of compulsory collective bargaining. Many decisions 
made by management affect the job security of employees. 
Decisions concerning the volume and kind of advertising 
expenditures, product design, the manner of financing, and sales, 
all may bear upon the security of the workers' jobs. Yet it is 
hardly conceivable that such decisions so involve 'conditions of 
employment' that they must be negotiated with the employees' 
bargaining representative. 
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with respect to terms and conditions of employment. 133 However, 
"placement of new operations is a topic of 'permissive' bargaining, 
over which the employer has no obligation to bargain with a union in 
the first place.,,134 From the premise of this comment that there is no 
unfair labor practice in a management decision to undertake a 
walkaway shop,135 it necessarily follows that such a decision not be 
subject to mandatory bargaining. Such a decision is both inherently 
management's to make and not by itself violative of employees' 
section 7 rights. 
One scholar has recommended legislation "guaranteeing employees 
significant input with respect to business decisions that directly affect 
their employment situations.,,136 Certainly, a walkaway shop that is 
accompanied by the purpose to chill union activity has a direct effect 
on the unionized employees' employment situation. 137 A walkaway 
shop that is not intended to have a chilling effect, on the other hand, 
does not so clearly have a direct effect. 138 On one hand, the decision 
could be direct if there are immediate changes at the existing 
facility.139 On the other hand, the impact would be indirect if changes 
come far down the road. 140 Indeed, when an employer reacts to the 
exercise of section 7 activity in the immediate term, "returning 
strikers [experience] alienation, frustration, anxiety, anger, and even 
depression.,,141 It is true that these feelings can be experienced by 
employees at an existing unionized plant that is not chosen for 
additional work. 142 In Boeing, employees in the Puget Sound region 
might feel alienated, frustrated, anxious, angry, and depressed 
because management chose to invest in a new, non-union plant. But 
if, as in Boeing, the unionized plant experienced an increase in 
work,143 these sentiments should not be present. The magnitude, or 
even the existence, of these feelings is likely far diminished when 
133. First Nat'l Maint. Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 689 (1981); see also Epstein, supra 
note 29. 
134. Epstein, supra note 29. 
135. See id. 
136. Charles B. Craver, The National Labor Relations Act at 75: In Need of a Heart 
Transplant, 27 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 311,347 (2010). 
137. See Estiund, supra note 36, at 933. 
138. See supra note 119 and accompanying text. 
139. See Estlund, supra note 36, at 933. 
140. See id. 
14l. Lyrissa C. Barnett, Maintaining Order in the Post-Strike Workplace: Employee 
Expression and the Scope of Section 7, 15 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 87, 102 
(1994). 
142. See Litvin, supra note 72, at 443. 
143. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text. 
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there has been no immediate detrimental impact on the unionized 
employees. Yes, employees at the unionized facility may experience 
these sentiments, but they should reasonably understand that this is 
not management impeding protected activity but making a legitimate 
business decision. 
The problem, as Estlund correctly points out, is that: 
In general, firms tend to invest more capital and locate more 
new production in non-union than in union plants; to 
relocate existing production, gradually or more rapidly, 
from union to non-union plants; and to favor largely 
unorganized regions over regions where labor is strong. It 
should therefore not be surprising that union operations are 
disproportionately selected for closure, sometimes based on 
higher labor costs, but often based on outmoded products 
and product technology. The result of these patterns is a 
steady flow of capital and jobs out of union operations. 144 
But, is making all such management decisions an unfair labor 
practice the answer? Estlund would say yes, because "[ u ]nion 
avoidance in capital allocation decisions is the silent plague of the 
labor movement.,,145 Indeed, studies have shown that union 
avoidance reduces the likelihood of unionization at new plants.146 
There is a distinction between long-term labor avoidance that should 
be the type of decision within the purview of managemene47 and 
144. Estlund, supra note 36, at 931-32. 
145. Id. at 933. 
146. See Thomas A. Kochan, Robert B. McKersie & Jon Chalykoff, The Effects of 
Corporate Strategy and Workplace Innovations on Union Representation, 39 INDUS. 
& LAB. REL. REV. 487,497-99 (1986) (discussing the impact of union avoidance on 
organization efforts). 
147. But see Estlund. supra note 36, at 943. Estlund frames the impact of capital allocation 
decisions on existing plants when she writes: 
[A] firm may choose to establish or expand a non-union plant 
while withholding capital investment and new business or new 
product lines from an existing plant. None of these decisions will 
appear to discriminate against the union workers, or even to affect 
them directly; none may even be actionable under the Act. 
Ultimately, however, the antiquated plant will be a prime 
candidate for shutdown; the shift of some or all of the work from 
the older, less advanced, higher cost (union) location to the newer, 
more modem, lower cost (non-union) location will be readily 
justified on economic grounds without reference to the union. 
Id. Estlund notes the difficulty in proving this long "train of events" and how that 
difficulty makes section 8(a)(3) "ineffectual." Id. at 943 n.8\. 
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capital-allocation decisions that may have the motive to chill 
unionization at existing unionized facilities. 148 
Thus, to Collingsworth, "a policy which emphasizes promoting 
unfettered flexibility for capital no longer furthers the goals of the 
NLRA.,,149 However, "many labor-management practices under the 
NLRA were meant to have room to grow and develop.,,15o 
Accordingly, it should come as no surprise that a management 
decision to operate a new facility should be viewed differently today 
than in the mid-twentieth century, or fifty years from now. 151 
Professor Estlund frames the situation well: 
But what constitutes a discriminatory motive? At one 
extreme are employers who act out of pure spite, whose 
desire for retaliation is untainted by instrumental motives 
such as the desire to chill the union activity of its other 
employees. Under the Darlington decision, an employer 
who closes all or part of its business for purely retaliatory 
reasons does not thereby violate Section 8(a)(3); only "a 
purpose to chill unionism in any of the remaining plants of 
the single employer" will suffice to establish an unlawful 
discriminatory purpose. The sharply limited definition of 
unlawful motive has been harshly and justifiably criticized, 
though its impact is more limited than its critics might have 
feared. This very narrow conception of the requisite 
purpose does not apply to employer decisions to close only 
some of the employer's operations at a given location, or to 
transfer work to another location or to a subcontractor; as to 
those decisions, proof of a desire to retaliate against 
employees choosing union representation or simply to avoid 
dealing with a union is sufficient to satisfy the motive 
requirement of Section 8(a)(3).152 
Thus, if the employer's purpose in opening a new plant instead of 
adding the new work to the existing operation is made in part to chill 
unionization and protected activity at the existing plant, such conduct 
148. See id. at 945 ("The Court in First National Maintenance reaffirmed that even major 
business decisions that are insulated from the duty to bargain ... are open to scrutiny 
under section 8(a)(3) if they are alleged to be discriminatorily motivated .... "). 
149. Collingsworth, supra note 57, at 76. 
150. Charles 1. Morris, A Blueprint for Reform of the National Labor Relations Act, 8 
ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 517, 526 (1994). 
151. See Hexter, supra note 71, at 305-06 (discussing how the world has changed since the 
NLRA was passed). 
152. Estlund, supra note 36, at 937-38. 
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should be an unfair labor practice. 153 Howeverlf there is no purpose 
to chill protected activity, however, then such management decisions 
should not be an unfair labor practice. 
Estlund would go further, stating, "the greater threat to employee 
rights comes from those many large enterprises that patiently follow a 
systematic, long run 'union avoidance' strategy for determining 
patterns of investment.,,154 But applying an expanded version of the 
Darlington test would alleviate Estlund' s concerns by providing 
protection to workers where the employer is seeking to stifle 
protected activity. 155 
Mmaking walkaway shops per se unlawful or subject to mandatory 
bargaining under the NLRA, however, would go too far in infringing 
upon core management decisions. 156 Employers should be able to, 
with limits, choose where to invest their dollars. If a slow, 
methodical union-avoidance strategy is legal, then unions may have 
to make some concessions in order to obtain new work. Unions can 
also sell the concept of unionization at new plants. 157 But under the 
long-term approach, the parties themselves will have to develop 
strategies: the employer will have to make capital allocation 
decisions, and the unionized facilities will have to compete for the 
dollars. 
4. Applying Estlund's Proposal to the Boeing Dispute 
To see how Professor Estlund's proposal would play out, her 
framework can be applied to the Boeing dispute. Under Estlund's 
framework, Boeing's conduct would be measured against a 
hypothetical non-discriminatory employer. 158 Boeing would be 
expected to bargain with the lAM because the decision to open a new 
facility in South Carolina instead of the Puget Sound region is one 
that may affect job security.159 Estlund posits that "[ e ]mployers who 
view unions as legitimate partners in the enterprise would be 
expected to bargain with unions over structural decisions that may 
153. See id. at 937. 
154. Id. at 945-46. Estlund continues, "The firm that bides its time and bites its tongue as 
it shrinks or eliminates its unionized operations has little or nothing to fear from the 
anti-discrimination mandate of the NLRA." Id. at 946. 
155. See discussion supra Part N.C.I-2. 
156. See discussion supra Parts II.B.2-3, IV.C.I-3. 
157. See, e.g., About SEIV, SERVICE EMP. INT'L UNION, http://www.seiu.orglour-Union! 
(last visited Dec. 11,2012). 
158. See Estlund, supra note 36, at 981. 
159. See id. at 942. 
174 UNIVERSITY OF BALTIMORE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42 
affect job security ... because it is in their interest to maintain the 
trust on which the cooperative enterprise is based.,,160 Estlund also 
suggests that employers would be incentivized to negotiate regarding 
capital allocation decisions because unions and employees "can affect 
many of the factors that typically go into the profitability or viability 
of operations.,,161 
Conversely, Epstein has noted, "[O]ne reason why Boeing got into 
trouble in this case was that it announced union difficulties, as 
opposed to cost savings, as the reason for its decision to open the 
South Carolina plant. Candor comes at a high cost in labor 
relations." 162 The different perspectives raised by Estlund and 
Epstein show why a partnership-type approach may not be 
practical. 163 
Returning to the analysis under Estlund's proposal, if Boeing made 
a structural decision that may affect union jobs, without undergoing 
good faith bargaining, there would be a presumption of anti -union 
discrimination. 164 Boeing could then rebut the presumption by 
demonstrating that negotiations would most likely have been 
counterproductive. 165 Estlund's approach presumes that bargaining 
would be beneficial for both parties, unless the employer could prove 
otherwise. 166 Under this model, the burden to show that bargaining 
would not be worthwhile is on the employer,167 even though this type 
of decision has long been held to be management's to make. 168 The 
real issue, however, is not about bargaining; it is about making a 
fundamental choice: what should firmly be a management decision? 
And then, even decisions that may impact unions, such as the 
decision to locate new work to a new facility, should stay within 
management's control. 169 Moreover, no unfair labor practice has 
been found in situations where the employer relocated its plant for 
economic reasons while also fulfilling its obligation to bargain. 170 
160. Id. at 981. 
161. Id. 
162. Epstein, supra note 29. 
163. Compare Epstein, supra note 29, with Estiund, supra note 36, at 960-61. 
164. Estlund, supra note 36, at 983. 
165. Id. 
166. Id. at 983-84. 
167. Id. 
168. Am. Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 311 (1965). 
169. Id. ("But we have consistently construed [8(a)(3)] to leave unscathed a wide range of 
employer actions taken to serve legitimate business interests in some significant 
fashion, even though the act committed may tend to discourage union membership."). 
170. See, e.g., In re Fiss Corp., 43 N.L.R.B. 125, 138, 154 (1942) (finding that the 
employer relocated for economic reasons without neglecting its duty to bargain), affd 
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As Estlund has noted, "Employers are fighting for flexibility and 
managerial prerogatives that they claim are crucial to their economic 
survival, while unions are fighting for their very existence in the face 
of aggressive managerial resistance and long-term attrition."l71 The 
purpose of the NLRA, however, is to reduce industrial strife and to 
give employees a voice.172 Additionally, the purpose of section 
8(a)(3) is "to allow employees to freely exercise their right to join 
unions, be good, bad, or indifferent members, or abstain from joining 
any union without imperiling their livelihood.,,173 
5. The Lawful Walkaway Shop 
A premise of this comment is that long-term union avoidance 
should not be seen as impacting employees in the exercise of their 
right to join unions unless the management's purpose is to chill 
unionism. 174 If an employer decides to create new work at a non-
union facility and does not intend to chill unionism, or as in Boeing, 
increases the number of workers at the unionized facility, the 
unionized employees' right to join a union is not being infringed 
upon. 175 
Thus, a distinction should be made. On one hand is the lawful 
walkaway shop, a long-term union avoidance strategy demonstrated 
by capital allocation decisions. 176 With a walkaway shop, a company 
could act similarly to Boeing and create new work at a new facility 
without any detriment to the existing unionized workers. 
Management would be able to reference past strikes as part of the 
justification for the decision. In making this distinction, this 
comment has strived to find a balance that provides insulation to 
management to make decisions that demonstrate long-term union 
avoidance, while also protecting employees in situations in which the 
employer's purpose is to chill unionism.177 Thus, employers should 
per curiam, 136 F .2d 990 (3d Cir. 1943); Kipbea Baking Co., 131 N .L.R.B. 411, 414-
17 (1961) (permitting an employer's decision to relocate for economic reasons after 
providing advance notice to the union about its plans). 
171. Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. REv. 
1527, 1543 (2002). 
172. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § lSI (1994). 
173. Julius Getman, The Boeing Case: Creating Outrage Out of Very Little, 27 AB.A. J. 
LAB. & EMP. L. 99,100 (2011) (quoting Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 
40 (1954)). 
174. See discussion supra Part III. 
175. Epstein, supra note 29. 
176. See discussion supra Part III. 
177. See discussion supra Part IV.C.I-4. 
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be able to follow long-tenn union avoidance strategies, not because 
there is not the potential for such strategies to impact unionization 
efforts, but because such decisions should be management's to 
make. 178 To be sure, Estlund would take issue with this distinction, 
having stated, "To allow the presence of the same 'economic 
motives' that underlie the discharge of union activists to insulate 
from liability 'union avoidance' in capital allocation decisions rests 
on a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of anti-union 
conduct." I 79 This is not a misunderstanding, but simply a different 
balancing of the rights of the stakeholders in management-labor 
relations. 
Furthennore, if masking union avoidance in long-tenn capital 
allocation decisions is an unfair labor practice, then there very well 
could be an impact on initial capital allocation decisions. 18o For both 
existing companies with new products and legitimate needs for new 
plants and new companies with new products, there will be strong 
motivation to locate the facility in an area where unions lack strength 
so that the employer is not confined in its decision making down the 
road. 181 Otherwise, an employer who opens a new facility that will be 
staffed by unionized workers soon after its opening will be hard 
pressed to open new facilities with non-union employees because 
such conduct will be seen as a step in long-tenn union avoidance. 182 
This is an unnecessary restraint. 
Additionally, it is important to remember that unions and 
employers are not partners. 183 While they necessarily work together, 
they have competing objectives and constituencies. 184 One need only 
look to the outcome of the Boeing dispute to see that the current 
process worked in that case. 185 This is not to say that unions should 
178. Estlund has argued that "the same motive that lies at the heart of the paradigmatic 
discriminatory discharge-a desire to avoid the real economic costs of unionization-
also underlies the larger patterns of investment and disinvestment that have 
increasingly relegated private sector unions to aging plants in shrinking sectors of the 
economy." Estlund, supra note 36, at 952. While this is a valid point, there is a 
difference between what Estlund describes and long-term union avoidance, because 
with the latter, there is not necessarily any negative impact on existing employees. 
179. ld. at 963. 
180. See supra text accompanying notes 44-45. 
181. See supra text accompanying note 146. 
182. See discussion supra Part II.B.3. 
183. First Nat'l Maint. Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 676 (1981) ("Nonetheless, in 
establishing what issues must be submitted to the process of bargaining, Congress had 
no expectation that the elected union representative would become an equal partner in 
the running of the business enterprise in which the union's members are employed."). 
184. ld. 
185. See supra text accompanying notes 33-34. 
2012] The "Walkaway Shop" 177 
give up on what they are seeking or that there should be a race to the 
bottom, but that certain decisions are inherently the employer's to 
make, and even if this results in a hurdle for unions, that is part of the 
price of capitalism. 186 Moreover, the union can gain leverage by 
using the investigation to impose pressure on employers to settle. 187 
The result is that the union will get some of what it wants, and there 
can be a win-win for both the employer and employees. 188 
There is some support for this contention from Professor Estlund, 
who recognizes what motivates employers when she writes, "The 
best defense of current doctrine sanctioning 'economically 
motivated' decisions about the allocation and relocation of capital is 
that it is simply inescapable-that employers must be free in a market 
economy to move capital from less profitable to more profitable 
uses.,,189 An expanded NLRA that precludes an employer from 
allocating capital away from unions in a slow manner could impede 
this conduct. It is not mutually exclusive to have a system that 
promotes unionization and worker rights while also recognizing 
certain employer prerogatives. 190 
Even if one agrees with Estlund's proposals and sentiments, the 
idea of precluding an employer from opening a new facility in order 
to avoid a union would be a slippery slope. As the Boeing dispute 
illustrates, the flexibility afforded the General Counsel in issuing a 
complaint may accomplish what Estlund is seeking-that a broader 
array of employer conduct will trigger an investigation of employer 
conduct because of the direct and indirect effects on employee 
rights. 191 But, taking Estlund's argument to its logical extension 
would be a bridge too far in limiting employer conduct. To be fair, 
Estlund tempers her recommendations when stating, 
While an aim of both New Deal economic policy and the 
modem economists I have relied upon was and is to 
discourage primary reliance on a low-wage, anti-union 
strategy by American firms, neither calls for prohibiting 
management from any consideration of labor costs or other 
economic consequences of unionization in its effort to 
186. See discussion supra Part IV.C.I-4. 
187. See Am. Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 317 (1965) (discussing how the 
Board can intrude upon area that employers and employees "can use in seeking to 
gain acceptance of their bargaining demands"). 
188. See Feinstein, supra note 3. 
189. Estlund, supra note 36, at 946. 
190. See discussion supra Part IV.C. 
19l. See discussion supra Part II.B. 
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compete. To do so would give union workers a kind of 
tenure protection against market forces that affect union and 
non-union firms alike. I do not contend that the Act was 
meant to do this. \92 
On the other hand, scholars at the conservative Heritage 
Foundation have suggested that Congress affirm that new capital 
investment decisions do not violate the Act. 193 While clarity is 
certainly needed in this regard, amending the NLRA is probably not a 
feasible solution, at least given the current makeup of Congress. 194 
Moreover, some flexibility should remain in the Act so that the 
NLRB can pursue investigations of alleged unfair labor practices. 
And as previously discussed, some new investment decisions do 
infringe upon protected employee activity.195 Therefore, a categorical 
exemption is unwarranted. Indeed, it should be noted that by issuing 
the complaint, the General Counsel was not finding Boeing liable for 
any conduct; this was merely a step in the adjudicative process. 196 
And given the valid concerns raised by Professor Estlund,197 it would 
be an overstep to close the door entirely to finding an unfair labor 
practice in all new capital investment decisions. Following the 
suggestion made by the Heritage Foundation's scholars is unlikely 
because amending the NLRA has historically been a difficult task. 198 
192. Estlund, supra note 36, at 979. Estlund continues, "The question is how to distinguish 
prohibited from permissible conduct in a way that takes proper account of the Act's 
prohibition of much economically rational resistance to and discrimination against 
union employees without imposing unwarranted restraints on management's ability to 
respond to market conditions." Id. 
193. Hans A. von Spakovsky & James Sherk, National Labor Relations Board Overreach 
Against Boeing Imperils Jobs and Investment, HERJTAGE FOUND. (May 11, 2011), 
http://report.heritage.orgllm0066 ("Congress should amend the National Labor 
Relations Act to reaffirm the long-standing construction ... that any new investment 
decisions-such as (but not limited to) expanding existing facilities, building new 
plants, or relocating-are not unfair labor practices and are outside the legal 
jurisdiction of an overzealous NLRB. "). 
194. See Estlund, supra note 171, at 1530 ("Most importantly, a longstanding political 
impasse at the national level has blocked any major congressional revision of the 
basic text since at least 1959. Moreover, the basic text itself, almost all of which dates 
from either 1935 or 1947, contains additional built-in obstacles to change."). 
195. See discussion supra Part IV.C. 
196. See Feinstein, supra note 3. 
197. See Estlund, supra note 36, at 971-77. 
198. Estlund, supra note 171, at 1530. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
While the facts of the Boeing case strongly point to there being no 
unlawful transfer of work,199 there certainly could be instances of 
long-tenn union avoidance that at the very least warrant 
investigation.20o In such a scenario, if an employer makes a decision 
to open a new plant instead of expanding work at an existing location 
with the then purpose of chilling union activity, there will be a 
finding of an unfair labor practice under a modified version of the test 
for partial closings.201 However, if a walkaway shop has no purpose 
to chill unionism, there should be no finding of an unfair labor 
practice.202 
An amendment to the NLRA such as that recommended by von 
Spakovsky and Sherk203 would preclude any remedy under the NLRA 
for any of the above mentioned scenarios, so their suggestion to 
eliminate certain unfair labor practices should be rejected because of 
the possibility of the illegal walkaway shop.204 A management 
decision to create new work at a new facility should not, by itself, 
constitute an unfair labor practice. 205 However, if such a decision is 
accompanied by threats that reveal a purpose to chill protected 
activity, or if the decision is accompanied by a proximate negative 
impact on the existing employees, then the current test for partial 
relocations provides a helpful starting point for detennining whether 
there has been an unfair labor practice. 206 Certainly, a decision to 
open a new plant may chill union activity at an existing plant, but this 
is not a foregone conclusion.207 
Although it will be difficult, if not impossible, to prove that an 
employer plans to close a union operation a decade down the road, 
that should not preclude an employer from being able to make core 
entrepreneurial decisions. 208 Under the NLRA, management does and 
should have the right to choose how to run its business, and the 
NLRA's authority should not be expanded to remove the ability to 
199. See discussion supra Part II.B. 
200. See discussion supra Parts III-IV. 
201. See discussion supra Part IV .B-C. 
202. See discussion supra Part IV.C.S. 
203. See supra note 193 and accompanying text. 
204. See discussion supra Part IV.C.4-S. 
205. See discussion supra Parts III-IV. 
206. See discussion supra Part IV.B. 
207. See discussion supra Part IV.C.4-S. 
208. See discussion supra Part IV.C.4-S. 
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make such decisions from employers.209 The union will have to work 
to organize the new facility and the cycle continues. But that is a 
better course than so severely curtailing decisions that are rightly 
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